Privatisation in Austria: Response to Internal and External Pressures by Ansgar Belke & Friedrich Schneider
PRIVATISATION IN AUSTRIA:




Privatisation has been a key element of structural
policy reforms in most European Union countries
including Austria during the last decade. Gov-
ernments undertaking privatisation have pursued
a variety of objectives: achieving gains in econom-
ic efficiency, given the extensive prevalence of
poor economic performance of public enterprises
in many countries and limited success with their
reforms; and improving the fiscal position, partic-
ularly in cases where governments have been
unwilling or unable to continue to finance deficits
in the public enterprise sector. In addition, bud-
getary-constrained governments, facing fiscal
pressures, have sometimes privatised mainly for
the reason of financing fiscal deficits with the pri-
vatisation proceeds.
The issues of privatisation (and sometimes deregu-
lation) have been reviewed in numerous studies
that have emphasised the potential efficiency
gains.1 Hence, the goal of this paper is twofold:
first, to provide some theoretical reasoning why
privatisation is useful as well as profitable for an
economy and, second, to empirically present the
extent of privatisation in Austria and other
European Union countries. Therefore, in the next
section, the reasons why privatisation is necessary
are elaborated. In the following part, the specific
pattern privatisation proceeds for Austria relative
to other EU and OECD countries is presented. A
final section concludes.
Reasons for privatising public enterprises
For at least the last century, economists have
employed a positive economic theory to explore
the implications of profit maximisation by private
firms operating in private property contexts. It is
only since the late 1960s that empirical studies
have been undertaken dealing with the behaviour
of publicly operated firms.2 Since then a large num-
ber of studies on a variety of activities of public or
private enterprises now exists,and their main focus
is the question of how public firms differ from their
private equivalents.
Basically two approaches are employed.The first is
the Property Rights approach. It concentrates on
the differences in the ease of captureability of eco-
nomic surplus of a resource and the rights to direct
an asset’s use, alter its from or transfer its claims
among existent and potential owners. In short, this
approach explores the differences in incentives
between public and private agencies caused by
variation in the ability of owners to monitor man-
agement and the problems that emerge when the
goals of “owners” and their agents, “managers”,
diverge.3 Numerous studies have been undertaken,
which have tested this proposition. The suggestion
that public enterprises are less efficient than pri-
vate ones, is confirmed in most of them.4 The sec-
ond one is the Public Choice approach and con-
centrates on political coalitions and their effect on
input usage and reward and/or product character-
istics.The Public Choice approach also includes the
theory of bureaucracy (Niskanen, 1971, 1975). The
Public Choice approach appears to provide a
broader analysis than the Property Rights one.The
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Public Choice approach assumes that
politicians, bureaucrats, managers of pub-
lic enterprises are selfish utility maximis-
ers subject to constraints.5 In this
approach it is assumed that a politician,
for example, will act selfishly in order to
reach his ideological or personal goals
under the constraint of winning the next
election. Since for a politician to stay in
power is the most important constraint
(or even sometimes goal), he will also use
public utilities for his own selfish goals.
The amount of privatisation in Austria
and other OECD economies
Privatisation in small open economies
If one first considers eleven small open
economies in Europe, of which one is
Austria, the results presented in Table 1
and in the Figure emerge. Table 1 shows
that the amount of privatisation was quite
moderate at the beginning of the 1990s
with the exception of Belgium. The Bel-
gium government privatised in 1993 public
utilities with proceeds of USD 956 million,
which is roughly 30 percent of all privati-
sation proceeds of the small open econo-
mies in Table 1 and the Figure.The second
highest privatisation proceeds in this year
were achieved by the Netherlands with
USD 780 million, followed by Portugal,
which had a quite ambitious privatisation
program over the years 1993–98, with pri-
vatisation proceeds over USD 12 billion.A
lot of well known public utilities in
Portugal were privatised like the power
plant EDP, the highway system BRISA
and cement factories ZINPOR. Also in
Austria the privatisation proceeds were
quite large. In 1998 the Austrian govern-
ment privatised firms with proceeds of
USD 2.94 billions. In Austria the selling of
25 percent of the public Telecom was the
biggest deal, where proceeds of USD 2.33
billion were achieved. Starting with rank
seven in 1993,Austria improved its perfor-





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5 Cf. Schneider and Frey (1988), Bartel and Schneider
(1991), Pardo and Schneider (1996) and Schneider
(2002).proceeds among small open economies steadily
with a peak in 1997 and at the end of the sample
ranks number three out of eleven. However, one
should not overemphasize this pattern, since the
amount of privatisation proceeds in small open
economies increased in general over 1993–98. In
the year 1993 it was USD 3.26 billion and in 1998
USD 20.246 billion.
In the Figure, the privatisation proceeds of small
open economies are shown in relation to GNP.One
clearly realises the dominant position of Portugal
over time, followed by the Netherlands and
Belgium, which display enormous privatisation
proceeds in the years 1993 and 1995. In Austria,
privatisation proceeds in percent of GDP amount
over the years to the average of the small open
economies under consideration. However, we can-
not detect any systematic correlation between the
degree of openness of an economy and its privati-
sation intensity. In general, this makes external
impact on the speed and intensity of privatisation
less plausible.
However, in Belke and Schneider (2003, 2005) we
show that this was not the case for Austria. At
most, the (announcement of) the launch of the
euro seems to have speed up the privatisation wave
in Europe. In general, one realises that the privati-
sation issue and the proceeds from privatisation
have been a considerable and policy-relevant issue
in the 1990s also for the small open economies.
Privatisation in Austria
Among those industrialised countries now await-
ing further privatisation, Austria is special in that
historically it is characterised by strong govern-
mental intervention. Large parts of the manufac-
turing and the electricity sector were nationalised
after World War II, in part to safeguard the coun-
try’s economic independence after German occupa-
tion and in part in order to finance the rehabilita-
tion of large-scale industries that were destroyed.
Jointly with public ownership in telecommunica-
tion, transport, and banking this generated one of
the largest public sectors in Europe.6
Seen on the whole, Austria’s economy has been
characterised by a relatively important state-
owned industry, a lack of own capital funds due to
the comparatively small company size, and a pre-
dominantly bank-based investment system. In
1998,Austria was characterised by 17 percent mar-
ket capitalisation relative to GDP, i.e. an even
lower valuation ratio than Italy (30 percent) and
Germany (39 percent;Boutchkova and Megginson,
2000, p. 9, Table III). Globalisation and Austria’s
accession to the EU have revealed the structural
problems of this system. Those sectors of the
Austrian economy which have been protected from
international competition such as, above all,
telecommunication, energy supply and the food
industries had to be integrated in the internal mar-
ket. As a consequence, restructuring programs
have recently been launched focusing on liberalisa-
tion and the privatisation of Austria’s economy. In
addition, joining the European Union represented
a structural break for Austria with respect to the
incentives to delay necessary deregulation and pri-
vatisation measures.7
The Austro-Keynesian era of stabilisation policy
which lasted from the beginning of the 1970s to the
mid 1980s can be viewed as an attempt at “direct
employment policy” in the public utilities and the
public industrial sector, mainly
in the basic (e.g. steel) machin-
ery and chemical industry. In a
sense, relatively large budget
deficits and a continuously in-
creasing debt-to-GDP ratio have
in the past often been excused
by pointing at the fight against
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unemployment. The primary goal of this type of
short-term policy in private goods markets was to
stabilise employment and real income in the
nationalised industry and, by means of the Austria-
specific industrial relations, in the private sector as
well. To achieve this political target various steps
were taken by public management: the mainte-
nance of the greatest possible level of production
in the face of diminishing prices and demand; the
greatest possible hoarding of employees even in
situations when rationalisation measures (dis-
missals) were required (resulting in unemployment
on the job); an over-dimensioned propensity to
invest (primarily with regard to the income effect
of investment); an expansionist wage and fringe
benefits policy with respect to buying power (caus-
ing high labour costs); and the financing of the
firms’ deficits out of the federal budget.
With regard to social and re-election problems aris-
ing from unemployment and low incomes, the
direct employment policy in public industrial firms
intended to smooth the inevitable adjustment
process to the rising requirements of global com-
petitiveness in the long run. Naturally the pursued
type of stabilisation policy immediately caused sub-
stantial effects on the public industrial firms’ pro-
ductivity, thriftiness and profitability, thus reducing
international competitiveness and augmenting
deficits in the short run (Nowotny 1982). None-
theless, production and employment could not be
maintained permanently at a high level, because
the rationalisation measures could not be post-
poned any longer. Since the mid 1980s, the Austro-
Keynesian stabilisation policy has been increasing-
ly criticised with respect to its long-term efficacy.
Finally, the troubling rise in the financial losses of
the state-owned firms in the iron and steel, chemi-
cal,machinery and vehicle industry caused a turn in
public opinion and economic policy.
The amount of subsidies to public industrial firms
with the aim of covering the deficits and financing
investment was limited to a fixed total and to the
period until 1989. This change of policy emerged
when the government realised that, due to the cri-
tique of the opposition, mass media and private
entrepreneurs as well as to the people’s fear of tax
increases,a majority of voters would not tolerate fur-
ther subsidies to public industrial firms any longer.In
this sense, the feedback from the voters to the gov-
ernment worked quite well in Austria. Prior to this
change in opinion, politicians had formed coalitions
with the management of the relatively large and
locally concentrated public firms in order to secure
the subsidies which rendered inefficiencies possible
and served their local constituency. Moreover there
were powerful shop stewards who were also mem-
bers of the legislating National Council and there-
fore succeeded in financing the expansionist enter-
prise policy from the federal budget.
From the end of the 1980s there was a turn around
in Austrian policy with respect to the public indus-
trial sector and public utilities. Not only did quite a
considerable privatisation take place in the 1990s
but also these enterprises where much less used for
re-election purposes partly due to the fact that – as
emphasised above – after joining the European
Union and the deregulation of former monopolies
into competitive markets it was much less attrac-
tive to use the public utilities and industries for re-
election purposes, mainly due to increasing public
budget problems induced by fierce tax competition
within the EU context. But also Austrian voters
reacted to political business cycles, their voting
behavior was more and more in line with the
Ricardian equivalence theorem. In the 1990s the
privatisation of Austrian state-owned industrial
firms and state-owned utilities reached USD 6 bil-
lion (compare Table 1) between 1993 and 1998.
These dramatic changes in Austrian policies, which
gained momentum in the 1990s led some authors
even to speak of “New Austrian Public Policies”
(see, e.g., Clemenz, 1999, p. 1).Although a substan-
tial privatisation took place, the privatisation
potential in Austria is still quite large. In most
cases, the Austrian government kept substantial
shares of partly privatised enterprises. Taking into
account the federal, state and community level and
including all public utilities, there is a privatisation
potential of 45 billion euro from which the federal
government owns 62 percent, the city or state of
Vienna 13 percent, all other states (e.g. Upper and
Lower Austria) 14 percent and the communes
(without Vienna) 11 percent. The latest privatisa-
tion proceeds of the federal government over the
years 1999 up to 2001 are presented in Table 2.
In 1999 a part of the Austrian tobacco (9.4 percent)
was privatised, which brought 6.8 billion euro. On
28 February 2000, the Austrian Federal Govern-
ment authorised the Minister of Finance to issue
the privatisation mandate to the Österreichische
Industrieholding AG (OeIAG), the Republic ofAustria’s holding and privatisation agency at the
annual general meeting on 17 May 2000. In accor-
dance with the mandate, OeIAG was required to
transfer 100 percent of the following companies or
interests in companies to completely new share-
holders, strategic partners or the general public:
Österreichische Staatsdruckerei GmbH, Doro-
theum GmbH, Print Media Austria AG, Flughafen
Wien AG, Österreichische Postsparkasse AG,
Telekom Austria AG, and Austria Tabak AG.
In carrying out this privatisation mandate in the
interests of the Austrian people, the OeIAG had to
“obtain the maximum revenue possible, taking into
consideration the companies’ and Austria’s interests”
(OeIAG 2003). It is important to note that the
OeIAG depends on the instructions issued by the
Republic of Austria. A second phase was envisaged
at that time, which involves examining the possibility
of even further privatisation. In the meantime, the
OeIAG has already privatised further companies or
parts of companies like Österreichische Staats-
druckerei GmbH, Dorotheum GmbH, Flughafen
Wien AG (17.4 percent), Österreichische Postspar-
kasse AG, Austria Tabak AG, Print Media Austria
AG, and Telekom Austria in compliance with the pri-
vatisation mandate of the federal government. In the
year 2000 100 percent of the Postal Bank was priva-
tised, and the proceeds amounted to EUR 970 mil-
lion.Also 24 percent of the state owned Telecom util-
ity was privatised with proceeds of EUR 763 million
via an initial public offering. In total in the year 2000
EUR 1.742 million privatisation proceeds were ac-
quired by the federal government. In the year 2001
41.1 percent of the Austrian tobacco state-owned
utility was privatised, which brought privatisation
proceeds of EUR 582.2 million.In total,from 1999 to
2001, privatisation proceeds amounted to EUR 2.455
billion.This is quite sizeable and helped the Austrian
government reduce its federal debt. However, some
Austria-specific features deserve more attention.8
Policy lessons from Austrian privatisation experience
Privatisation has certainly been a key-element of
structural reform in the European Union countries
including Austria, and proceeds from privatisation
have been substantial in most of these countries.
Gross receipts that can be transferred to the budget
are affected by actions prior to sale, the sales process
and the post-privatisation regime. An evaluation of
the potential uses of privatisation receipts or pro-
ceeds should reflect the implications for government
net worth and their macroeconomic impact. In so far
as government net worth is concerned, proceeds
from privatisation do not often indicate themselves
that the government is better off. Privatisation has
longer term implications in terms of revenues for-
gone and/or expenditures that will not be made in the
future and government decisions on the use of pro-
ceeds should reflect this inter-temporal effects.
Government net worth will rise to the extent that pri-
vate sector ownership leads to an increase in effi-
ciency and the government shares in this gain.
The macroeconomic effects of privatisation de-
pend, in part, on whether receipts/proceeds are
from domestic or foreign sources, the degree of
capital mobility and the exchange regime. Broadly
the effects of a decrease in the deficit financed by
privatisation receipts would be similar to those
resulting from a debt-financed fiscal expansion.
Both the economic recovery and privatisations
lead to receipts which can be used to lower the
deficit.The use of proceeds to reduce external debt
provides for an automatic sterilisation of what may
be substantial capital inflows associated with pri-
vatisation. The reduction of domestic debt may
impact on domestic stability.
This contribution has shown that there are good rea-
sons for privatisation in general although this strate-
gy raises some opportunity costs and that the privati-
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Table 2
Latest privatisationproceeds in Austria
(Federal government) over 1999-2001
Year Public enterprise Proceeds
k million
1999
Privatisation of 9.4% of the
AustrianTobacco AG
6.8
100% PSK (Postal Bank) 969.5







17.38% Airport  Vienna AG 54.1







Source: Ministry of Economic Affairs (2002).
8 An additional comprehensive and informative source on the his-
tory of privatisation in Austria is Clemenz (1999), pp. 5ff. For eco-
nomic consequences of privatisation in Austria in terms of perfor-
mance measures, see in detail Belke and Schneider (2005).CESifo DICE Report 1/2005 31
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sation proceeds are able – under certain circum-
stances – to enhance the welfare of these countries.
With regard to Austria we are skeptical about
whether Austria’s privatisation potential has been
exploited up to now and whether the speed of pri-
vatisation, although quite sizeable, has really been
sufficient. However, future prospects for quick and
full privatisation in Austria are rather gloomy
although economic theory (Alchian and others) and
also empirical evidence suggest that only full as
opposed to partial privatisation is successful with
respect to a better economic performance in the long
run (Boardman and Vining 1989, 1991). However, as
long as politicians interfere with this process, there
will be no unhindered development towards full pri-
vatisation.This assessment is all the more valid when
considering the Austrian habit of appointing former
members of the Austrian government as CEOs of the
Austrian privatisation agency OEIAG, in which the
state is still determined to keep a strategic stake.
In Belke and Schneider (2003), we elaborate on
some further idiosyncratic extensions for the
Austrian case. Especially in the Austrian case, any
discussion of privatisation cannot be reduced to
observing cash flows, employment performance
and the stock-exchange ratings of the privatised,
formerly state-owned, enterprises (SOEs). Polito-
economic aspects relating to income distribution
and ideology play an important role in explaining
the manner,extent,speed and the economic effects
of privatisation and must also be considered.
The Maastricht debt criterion,one of the conditions
for EMU entry was a likely incentive for privatisa-
tion. Already in 1998 Germany and France were
said to have sold their “family silver” in order to
push their debt below the 60 percent of GDP
threshold.However,there was a considerable accu-
mulation of privatisation efforts towards the end of
the1990s. Hence, it appears logical to also ask how
much of Austria’s privatisation efforts in the 1990s
was enacted in order to fulfil the Maastricht debt
criterion and later on to obey the stability pact, or
at least was sold to the public as such.9 In this
sense, governments were tempted to use privatisa-
tion receipts in order to reduce their public debt in
order to meet one convergence criterion.
We already pointed out that in France privatisation
activities were highest in 1998, the year before the
launch of the euro, due to the privatisation of
France Telecom. Based on similar motives, the cur-
rent Austrian government has generally pursued a
(in economic terms) liberal and market-oriented
economic policy, which has focused on privatisa-
tion and a reduction of state influence on business.
In line with this, the electricity sector was opened
to competition in September 2001 leading to lower
prices for customers and more competitiveness of
Austria’s electricity industry. In addition, bureau-
cratic procedures in doing business in Austria have
been simplified. One of the government’s main
concern, however, has been to achieve a balanced
budget in order to satisfy the EU’s Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP).10
In 1999,Austria’s budget deficit exceeded the EU-set
Maastricht criterion of a maximum deficit of 3 per-
cent, which drew severe criticism from the EU. (The
irony of history being that at the end of 2003 Austria
was legitimised to accuse the large euro area coun-
tries of disregarding the rules of the Stability and
Growth Pact).While aiming to reach a zero budget in
2002, the Austrian finance minister Grasser was able
to announce achievement of this goal in November
2001. In our understanding, this was primarily due to
an unexpectedly sharp increase in Austrian tax rev-
enue in 2001, as revenues from corporation tax and
income tax rose significantly and debt-servicing costs
decreased. In addition, the states and municipalities
assisted in balancing the federal budget as they
accrued budget surpluses.The need to lower the bud-
get deficit, however, also served as a strong (but only
indirect) stimulus for privatisation efforts in order to
raise additional revenues by increasing the efficiency
of the Austrian economy.11
It is important to note, however, that privatisation
proceeds are only allowed to have an impact on the
public debt but not on the public deficit.
Privatisation proceeds may not be included in the
9This question was raised by Aiginger (1997),p.351,with respect to
the very early second privatisation wave in Austria in the second
half of the 1980s,which he answered as follows:“Sie war durch den
Regierungseintritt der ÖVP initiiert und wohl wegen der
Budgetengpässe durchsetzbar” [It was initiated when the ÖVP
took over the government and enforceable because of the budget
shortage].Analogously,Jeronimo,Pagan and Soydemir (2000) ana-
lyze whether deficits and indebtedness in the 1990s in Spain, Italy,
Portugal and Greece were associated with a shift from privatisation
as a tool of economic restructuring, to privatisation as a tool of
European monetary convergence. Their empirical results suggest
that privatisation funds accruing from the sale of state-owned
enterprises in southern European countries might have been used
to tackle budget deficits and meet the stringent debt criterion for
monetary integration.
10 See, among others, Clemenz (1999), p. 1.
11 However,even under the “New Austrian Public Policies”the EU
commitment could not prevent the emergence of a political cycle.
Even shortly after the Maastricht Treaty came into force, the
Austrian government deficits and debt increased systematically for
three consecutive years before the general elections of 1994. See,
e.g., Clemenz (1999), p. 4.public deficit in Maastricht definition according to
the EC directive 3605/93 of the Council from
November 22, 1993.This is a point often neglected
by authors writing on Austrian privatisation and
the fiscal Maastricht criteria and also not always
clear in Austrian political circles (see, e.g., Natio-
nalrat der Republik Österreich 1996, p. 19). Seen
on the whole, thus, the Austrian case is a good
example of how external constraints can discipline
a “consensus-oriented” country. It seems fair to
state that without EU-membership and the strive
for meeting the Maastricht criteria, the evidence in
favour of “New Austrian Public Policies” and
increasing privatisation activity would have been
much weaker than it already is.
Although beneficial it itself, the main aim of privati-
sation should not as a rule primarily be to finance
and lower the public debt for political purposes.
Otherwise privatisation would tend to serve short-
run objectives instead of promoting long-run goals,
such as fostering productivity. In this case, the stan-
dard purpose of privatisations, the improvement of
competitiveness and profitability of former SOEs is
under-emphasised in favour of repaying outstanding
debt which, however, is not necessarily welfare
enhancing. However, the latter was given a high pri-
ority in recent Austrian laws and directives (Austrian
Parliament 2000). Instead, the revenues from privati-
sation should only be used for the creation of new
assets in the areas of education, R&D, technology
and infrastructure (Katsoulakos and Likoyanni 2002,
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